While the above views have a strong theoretical underpinning, there are some strands in the industrial organization (IO) and strategy literature that strongly argue against these conclusions. The 'efficiency' school in IO (e.g., Demsetz, 1973; Mancke, 1974) has long claimed that profits reflect rents to unique assets (e.g., efficient production, unique brand names) and not profits from the exercise of market power. Higher industry profits simply reflect the high efficiency of some firms. The resource-based view of the firm has elaborated this notion in the strategy literature. While the existence of market power is not ruled out, unique assets are viewed as the key drivers of above-normal returns (e.g., Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) .
The empirical literature on this running argument is substantial (see, for example, Carlton and Perloff, 1994 , for a review of the IO literature). Two papers in particular have received attention in the strategy literature. Schmalensee (1985) concludes after an extensive analysis of 1 year of U.S. line of business data that industry effects largely overshadow firm-specific effects. Rumelt (1991) , however, comes to the opposite conclusion when he extends the data base to several years of the same data. Some papers find that both efficiency and power effects may be found in some industries (e.g., Cool, Dierickx, and Jemison, 1989 ). There certainly is no widespread agreement on the relative importance of power vs. efficiency as determinants of industry profits.
This paper attempts to further the debate by focusing on one possible source of noise in the analyses: the existence of multiple power concepts, each with a different impact on profits. It uses a new, detailed data base on strategy, industry structure, and profits in French manufacturing industry that was first compiled in 1994 by the Banque de France. In the first part of the paper, we briefly review the literature on power in exchange relationships and discuss how different power concepts with different effects on firm profits may be defined. These power concepts and their profit impact are subsequently studied in the empirical analysis. The data sources, variable definitions, and research methods are described in the second section. The empirical results are provided in the third section. Implications and limitations are raised in the final section.
LITERATURE REVIEW Concentration and industry structure
A standard prediction in IO research is that the relative power of adjacent industries in a supply chain is a function of their relative concentration (everything else equal). The profits of industries and firms ('sellers' 1 ) that are stuck between highly concentrated supplier and buyer industries are likely to be adversely affected since they may have to accept prices that maximize the profits of the buyer and supplier industries. Vice versa, industries that are more concentrated than the upstream or downstream parts of the supply chain may seize the opportunity to minimize input costs and set prices such that their profits are maxi-mized. Thus, concentration provides conditions for (tacit) coordination of pricing decisions and profit maximization.
Empirical research that has sought to link concentration and relative power in adjacent industries to industry profitability has found some supporting evidence. Industry price-cost margins were found to be negatively (if weakly) affected by buyer concentration (Lustgarten, 1975; McGuckin and Chen, 1976) . In studies by Martin (1983) and Ravenscraft (1983) , concentration of the supplying industry was found to have a strong and significantly negative effect. When firm profitability was the dependent variable, more ambiguous results were obtained. On the one hand, concentration of the supplier industry was observed to have a negative and significant impact (Ravenscraft, 1983; Galbraith and Stiles, 1983) . On the other hand, Ravenscraft (1983) found that weighted average buyer concentration was positively related to firm profitability. His explanation was that firms could economize on marketing and sales costs if there were fewer buyers. Using the PIMS data, Cowley (1986) found that the number of buyers accounting for 50 percent of the selling firm's total sales was positively associated with firm gross margins but also with firm fixed costs, leading to an insignificant 'total' relation with profitability. As intuitive as the power concept is, there are no clear-cut results from these empirical analyses.
The ambiguity of the results may be due to the effects of two factors: a varying degree of market share distribution for a given level of concentration, and the incidence of vertical integration across the suppliers', sellers' and buyers' industries. First, Kwoka (1979) found that the same degree of seller concentration can have a different impact on industry profits depending on whether the share distribution of the leading firms reflects clear leadership or similar market share positions. The explanation is that in industries where the leading firms have a similar share of the market, fights for leadership and market share more often erupt. Vice versa, a clear market share leadership is more likely to lead to price discipline and higher industry profits.
If Kwoka's argument were right, then higher buyer or supplier concentration does not necessarily lead to lower profits for the firms in the middle if there is no clear share leadership in the adjacent industries. In addition, a strong market share leadership in the industry in the middle may help to offset the effects of concentrated buyers or suppliers.
A second source of noise in previous empirical results may be the degree of vertical integration across adjacent stages of the supply chain. When a buyer is partially integrated backward into its seller's industry, it may find out the true costs of production and thus have greater leverage to lower input prices (Porter, 1980) . 2 Yet, a seller may reduce this leverage if it has similar information about the buyer's industry. Also, by passing inputs through at marginal cost, the vertically integrated firms may squeeze the non-integrated specialists in the upstream or downstream markets. If the supplier or buyer industry is not highly concentrated but is integrated forward or backward in the seller's industry, they may exercise more power than their concentration level may imply.
Further, a high vertical integration of buyers or suppliers into the seller's industry may be at the basis of a positive rather than a negative concentration-seller profitability relationship. This may be the case if the sellers' industry is a significant source of profits to buyers or suppliers and if they fear retaliation from the sellers.
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Integrated suppliers or buyers may similarly limit competition in the seller's industry if they fear that their actions in the seller's industry may have spillover effects in their own industry (i.e., multipoint competition).
In sum, we posit that the profitability of sellers will be higher if there is a higher degree of market share leadership in their industry and a lower degree of market share leadership in the buyers' and suppliers' industries. We also maintain that the effect of vertical integration on sellers' profits needs to be determined empirically since integration across the chain has positive and negative consequences.
2 For example, Coca-Cola in Europe has partially integrated into the production of tops for beverage cans. This allows it to understand the costs of top manufacturing which beverage can manufacturers traditionally bundled into their final price. 3 In the champagne industry, grape growers ('the suppliers') have integrated forward in a tapered way into the business of champagne producers ('the sellers'). The grape price per kilogram is typically set at one-third the price of a bottle of champagne in the previous year. Since growers derive most of their revenues and profits from the selling of grapes, they traditionally have avoided price competition in the sales of champagne bottles.
Dependence
Reasons for the absence of unequivocal results on the impact of concentration of buyers and suppliers on seller profitability may be found also in other fields that study power. Sociologists (e.g., Emerson, 1962) have long argued that power is to be understood by analyzing dependency relations. The central tenet of 'dependency theory' (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is that the power one party can wield over the other depends on the relative importance of the resources each controls. If the resources of one party are essential to the other party, then this dependence puts the controlling party in a powerful position. Vice versa, if parties can switch relatively easily to other parties, power will be low. Network theory (e.g., Burt, 1992) provides a similar prediction. Individuals who control the flow of information and resources in a network of people are in a position to exercise power.
Translated to supply chains, the above implies that sellers of products that are unimportant to buyers because they contribute little to achieving a cost or differentiation advantage vis-à-vis the buyers' customers are in a weak position. Similarly, if a buyer represents a large share of a seller's revenues and if this buyer cannot be easily replaced, then it is in a powerful position. Vice versa, if a buyer faces a high cost to change suppliers, then the supplier is in a powerful position.
The concentration and dependence explanations of power may lead to similar predictions of power on profits. For example, a high cost for a seller to change suppliers imposes a limit on the number of suppliers the seller can draw on and it therefore may face a higher seller concentration. However, concentration and dependency power are not necessarily observed in the same situation. For example, dependency may be specific to a product rather than a supplier. Within a product class, there may be many alternative suppliers which can be changed at little cost even though costs to switch to a supplier of another product class are large.
4 Also, concentration need not imply switching costs; concentration because of economies of scale in the seller's industry may not give rise to switching costs or other dependencies.
5 Thus, concentration and dependency power refer to two different phenomena.
Further, dependence power need not reduce the profitability of the supplier, seller and buyer. Parties which are in a dependence relation may be able to structure the pay-offs such that a Pareto-efficient outcome is obtained. That is, rather than opting for a distributive bargaining solution, both parties may realize that an integrative bargaining outcome with an optimization along the multiple issues in the dependency relationship may increase joint pay-offs.
Resource dependence may also be linked to the transaction cost argument regarding relationships between two parties. Coase (1937) , Williamson (1979) , and others in this school of thought argue that transaction-specific investments may be required to obtain efficient operations. If parties choose a market solution rather than vertical integration, then they will be faced with the dependence power of each other. Depending on whether the parties behave opportunistically (or not), the resource dependency inherent in the relation with high transaction costs may adversely (or positively) influence the profits of the parties. Again, we may note that the effect of power dependency on the profits of suppliers, sellers, and buyers is not unequivocal.
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There is some evidence on the effects of product dependence on profitability. Using U.S. inputoutput tables, Bradburd (1982) calculated a measure of weighted industry cost importance and found it to be negatively related, if weakly, to industry price cost margins. Cowley (1986) also found that cost importance was negatively associated with industry profitability (gross margins). Galbraith and Stiles (1983) found an insignificant relation of firm (seller) profitability with both the importance of a supplier's product to the seller and the importance of the seller's products to the buyer. 5 For example, there are high scale economies in the petrochemical industry. This leads to an increasing concentration among producers. However, their customers are still able to switch among suppliers given the commodity nature of most plastics. 6 A referee pointed also to a variation of the endogeneity problem raised by Masten (1993) . The effect of power dependency on profitability may not be easily assessed as some situations where there was a negative relation may have been 'solved' (and thus taken out of the data) by vertical integration. See also Monteverde (1997) .
In sum, the dependence power of buyers and suppliers is predicted to adversely affect seller profitability. However, to the extent that dependency relations in supply chains are extensive and involve many negotiation issues, parties could obtain integrative bargaining outcomes. Dependency power in supply chains therefore may also be associated with higher profitability of sellers (and buyers and suppliers).
Credible commitments
The burgeoning game theory view on decision making has derived yet another view on power in exchange relationships. The essential element is the ability to create credible commitments which may change the other party's perception of the situation or change the pay-offs such that actions in a direction favorable to the party making the strategic moves are obtained (Schelling, 1960; Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991) . These moves need to be credible, hence involve costly irreversible commitments, to change the pay-offs among choices and thus the choice parties will make. Such credibility is obtained by limiting on purpose the freedom of action of the party making the moves. This can be done in an unconditional way (e.g., cutting off communication, 'scorched earth' tactics, etc.) or by committing to a rule of behavior (threats and promises, warnings and assurances, establishing and maintaining reputations for behaving in a certain way, etc.).
Projected to power in supply chains, we may expect that the exchange of threats and promises and other commitment moves will affect the outcomes of negotiations on costs, prices, and thus profits. Rather than integrating forward or backward, a credible threat to do so may be sufficient to obtain desired concessions. Similarly, a commitment to an exclusive, long-term contract may be sufficient to reduce prices or a supplier who has a reputation as a tough negotiator in other industries may benefit from this reputation in its negotiations in the seller's industry. Some firms may have reputations for zealous cost cutting in negotiations which render further cost cutting even easier.
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While the threat of integration of a significant buyer or supplier may be sufficient to reduce prices of all sellers, the effect of credible commitments is more likely to be observed at the firm level. A credible commitment implies the purposeful limitation to a course of action which inflicts costs on the party making the commitment. The coordination among suppliers or buyers has to be very strong to obtain such commitments of all suppliers or buyers. In contrast, an individual supplier may commit itself and achieve results for itself. Thus, an impact on firm rather than industry profitability is more likely to be found.
In sum, various literatures make predictions about power and outcomes in exchange relationships. First, the 'concentration' view hypothesizes that the relative concentration of adjacent industries will, all else equal, determine which industry will be able to set prices to its advantage. However, we argued that the profitability of sellers will be higher if there is a higher degree of market share leadership in their industry and a lower degree of market share leadership in the buyers' and suppliers' industries. We also concluded that the effect of vertical integration on sellers' profits needs to be determined empirically since integration across the chain has positive and negative consequences. Second, the 'dependency' view hypothesizes that power in exchange relations is a function of the relative control of the resources that are needed by the parties in the exchange. Again, we noted that a prediction of the effects of this power source on seller profits is not straightforward since the concentration and dependence sources of power may offset each other and since parties may choose to negotiate Pareto efficient outcomes rather than use the power to negotiate distributive outcomes. Third, the 'credible commitment' view hypothesizes that suppliers or buyers which are able to change (the perceptions of) the pay-offs may bring about outcomes that are favorable to themselves. These commitments may be based on factors other than size or switching costs and could be due to reputations, threats, etc. Given the different concepts of power and the many possible effects, it is not surprising that empirical analyses of power and profits do not have unequivocal findings.
The ambiguity concerning the different power concepts and their effect on firm profits also affects the debate about the importance of industry vs. resource-based sources of profits. Previous anlayses may have underestimated the effects of power on profitability and overestimated the effects of firm-specific factors since the concept of power is not clearly understood. Too much of the explanation of profitability may have been left to resource-based explanations if relevant power factors were excluded. In the empirical analysis below, we will seek to empirically identify and test the different power concepts and their relationships with seller profitability. Their importance for firm profitability will be contrasted with the importance of a factor capturing resourcebased explanations.
RESEARCH DESIGN Data and sample selection
In 1994, the Banque de France collected for the first time detailed industry and strategy data on the French manufacturing industry. The data collection project, called Sesame, consists of a questionnaire that is administrated by professional interviewers of the Banque de France. It covers a broad cross-section of approximately 2000 French manufacturing firms. The objective of the bank is to complement its financial information with a more complete overview of industries and firms. The majority of companies in the survey are small and medium-sized French industrials (from 20 to 2000 employees) that tend to be focused in one or a small number of 4-digit 'SIC code equivalent' industries. They compete either in domestic or international markets, or both. Since very large firms are excluded, the data base does not represent a random sample of all firms in each industry. However, the sample may be a random sample of small and medium-sized manufacturing firms and of some industries that have primarily small to medium-sized firms. The homogeneity of the sample will be addressed below.
Interviews in each company are conducted with the chief executive officer.
8 Up to 400 questions are asked concerning the firm's strategy process, industry environment, competitive position, organizational structure, and external growth patterns. The questions are derived from the literature in the strategy, organizational behavior, and industrial organization fields.
The number of firms surveyed ranges from one firm in industry 2117 (small armaments and guns) to over 100 firms in industry 2108 (fabricated metal products-molds and models). In the sample for this study, we included only those sectors for which there were at least 20 firms to minimize the possible effects of outliers. Further, some firms participate in multiple product markets and the profitability data therefore capture the results of effects in all of these markets. To be able to distinguish industry and firm effects, we included firms in the sample only if at least 70 percent of their sales originated in one 4-digit SIC code. Finally, firms for which there were missing observations for the variables under study were deleted. After these selections, seven sectors remained: 2001 (iron and steel foundries), 2102 (metal cutting and forming), 2108 (fabricated metal products-molds and models), 2408 (boiler manufacturing), 2409 (machinery for food, chemical plastics and shoes), 5302 (diverse plastic products), and 5303 (plastic packaging). The total number of firms in our sample is 187. A summary of the key indicators of these industries and firms is given in Table 1 .
Variable selection
The survey contains many indicators of the power of suppliers, sellers and buyers. The questions which were posed to each CEO, and which were used here, are given in Appendix 1. The eight questions regarding supplier power and the nine 9 questions regarding buyer power were patterned after statements made by Michael Porter in his 1980 book Competitive Strategy. These variables were factor analyzed to determine whether different power concepts (power j ) could be identified. The coding of several variables was first reversed such that high values of all factors would measure high power of suppliers or buyers. 10 The factor analysis results are discussed in the third part of the paper.
To distinguish the effects of power on profitability from other possible effects, control variables were introduced. In particular, we controlled for three industry characteristics of the seller's industry: the growth of the seller's product market (growth), the perceived threat of substitution (subst), and barriers to entry (capint). The growth and substitution threat indicators are intended to capture possible demand-side influences on profitability. A measure of capital intensity (investment in property, plant and equipment/sales) was chosen to proxy barriers to entry. This proxy was selected since all firms were drawn from sectors where investments entail large capital outlays. Estimates for other barriers (e.g. R&D, advertising) were not used since these were judged to be less critical for the selected industries.
The resource-based view of the firm hypothesizes that a firm's asset stocks are key drivers of firm profitability. Indicators of such stocks thus would have to be included. Unfortunately, direct measures of stocks are not available in the Sesame data base. To limit estimation bias, we included a market share measure since this has been found to be related to asset stocks (e.g., Cool, Dierickx, and Jemison, 1989) . However, since market share may also capture market power effects, such modeling limits the interpretation of the findings for this variable. Market share thus is a 'control variable' which should be positively related to seller profits because of the capital stocks and market power effects that drive it. The share variable used here, relms, was defined as (market share)/(the share of the leading firm). The share variable was normalized because the share distribution in each of the sectors is not identical.
Finally, the profitability measure used in this study is return on sales (ros), excluding extraordinary profits and losses from financial or operating sources. It is defined at the firm level as are the other variables. Inferences about power and profits therefore need to be limited to the firm level and cannot automatically be generalized to the industry level. However, possible industrylevel effects are introduced through fixed and random effects in the regressions.
Estimation
The relationship between firm profitability and its covariates was analyzed with regression analysis. The general form of the estimated equations (omitting firm-level suscripts) is 
with i = 1,7 sectors and j = 1, m power variables. The power variables which largely correspond to the concepts discussed above are identified in the next section. The equation was first estimated with the intercept term restricted to be the same across the sectors (␣ i = ␣ for all i). This was estimated with robust standard errors following White (1980 White ( , 1982a White ( , 1982b to correct for the heteroskedasticity in the data. The equation was then estimated with fixed effects, allowing the intercept to vary across the sectors (␣ i , i = 1,7) to determine the incidence of a general sector effect. Sector effects were modeled also as a random variable included in the error term (e.g., Maddala, 1977: 326-331 ). In such estimation, the error term has two components: the traditional error term which is unique to each observation and which captures 'general ignorance' about factors that affect all sectors, and a second error term which is unique to each sector. This second component captures 'ignorance' about the cross-section unit and is treated as a random term rather than a fixed parameter (which merely shifts the regression line). This random effects specification allows us to estimate the ␤ coefficients with more degrees of freedom since we do not need to estimate a parameter for each sector. Of course, following standard leastsquares estimation assumptions, the error component capturing sector effects should not be correlated with the regressors. A Hausman test which checks for correlation between the errors and the regressors is used to decide whether a fixed or random components model is more appropriate.
Finally, we estimated the model with a differ-ent objective function: least absolute deviations (LAD) rather than least-squared (LS) errors (see, for example, Judge et al., 1985, chapter 20) . If the data distribution is 'fat tailed' or contains outliers where the exact form is not known, the LAD estimator may be more efficient than the LS. 11 We wanted to verify whether this estimation criterion would affect the results in view of the unknown sample characteristics. However, given that we selected sectors with a minimum of 20 firms, we expected LAD estimates to be quite similar to LS estimates.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Factor analysis of the power measures
The results of the two principal component analyses (with varimax rotation) of the indicators of buyer and supplier power are shown in Table 2 . Only those factors with an eigenvalue i Ͼ 1 were retained. Before interpreting the factors, we may make two general points. First, the factor analyses produced several factors for both buyer and supplier power. This indicates that the power concept is indeed multidimensional. Further, the orthogonality of the factors confirms that the factors are different and that each may have an independent impact on seller profitability. Including only one power measure in empirical analyses, as most previous studies have done, therefore is likely to understate the importance of buyer and supplier power. In addition, it may lead to biased estimates if some of the excluded power 11 The estimates are efficient if the disturbances have a Laplace distribution, and have a smaller variance if the disturbances have a fat tail distribution such as Cauchy's and Student's t. variables are correlated with variables in the regression. Second, for each set of buyer and supplier power indicators, four factors were identifiable. To evalute the robustness of the present results which are based on sectors with at least 20 firms, we also ran factor analyses on samples which had firms from a wider variety of sectors. In one sample, industries were included which had a minimum of only five firms. In another sample, the cut-off for including industries was those with a minimum of 10 firms. In both samples, a same number of factors with loadings similar to the factors shown in Table 2 were found. The results for the largest sample, the sample with a minimum of five firms per industry, are provided in Appendix 2. This suggests that the power concepts obtained here are not simply artifacts of the sample but are very likely representative of a larger population of manufacturing industries. The factors are interpreted next.
Supplier power
The loadings in Table 2 help us define the factors. The first factor loads positively and highly on two variables: the number of potential suppliers (reverse coded) and supplier concentration. It is termed structural buyer power (strsup) as it captures the common IO view of power of suppliers-high concentration and a low number of possible suppliers. Three variables load positively on the second factor: impact on seller's cost, impact on seller's differentiation and supplier's switching cost (reverse coded). That is, the factor gives expression to questions whether the seller depends on its supplier for its cost and differentiation and whether the supplier heavily depends on the seller. This factor is called dependence power of suppliers (depsup).
The third supplier factor is highly correlated with the 'capacity' of suppliers to bargain strongly and with the cost to the seller to switch suppliers. That is, it captures a seller's perception or attribution of the power of its suppliers. We call it attribution power of suppliers (attsup) since it rests on the perception of sellers rather than on a market or supplier characteristic. Finally, a fourth factor loads almost perfectly on one variable: the incidence of forward integration from suppliers. This factor represents the power that suppliers may obtain from actual (or possible) forward integration and is named integration power (intsup).
The close correspondence between the observed factors and the strands in the literature confirms that power may be conceptualized as a multidimensional concept and that the various forms of power are borne out by the data. The concentration, dependence, and commitment views of power may indeed be proxied by strsup, depsup, and attsup. In the literature review in the first section, it was noted also that vertical integration may have an impact on the relationship between concentration and profits. The factor analysis shows that vertical integration is a separate source of power and indeed may influence the relationship between concentration and seller profitability.
Buyer power
Similar to the power of suppliers, four factors were identified in the analysis of the measures of buyer power. Although the factors are not identical, there is a high resemblance between the factors measuring both sources of power. A factor measuring structural power (strbuy) is again observed and loads positively on the variables measuring the number of potential buyers (reverse coded) and buyer concentration. However, it also loads positively on the variable measuring the cost to the seller if a buyer were to switch ('cost to switch buyers'). As mentioned in the literature review, high concentration does not require dependence but may be consistent with it. This unidirectional dependence of the seller on its customers is observed here.
We also note a factor which captures attributed power, attbuy, which loads highly on the variable measuring the capacity of the buyer to drive a hard bargain. It also loads highly on the variable measuring the perceived role of price in negotiations. Given that this variable was not available as an indicator of supplier power, we are unable to compare results. Both variables, however, capture seller's perceptions of buyer power. In particular, this factor suggests that attributions of high bargaining power are often made in situations where price is perceived to be an important point of negotiations.
The variables measuring the importance of the seller's product to its buyers in terms of the cost and differentiation advantage it creates again load on the same factor which we call buyer dependence power (depbuy). The analog to the variable measuring the cost to suppliers when losing a buyer is also associated with this factor: the cost to the buyer to switch suppliers. This factor is completely symmetrical to the depsup factor. Finally, vertical integration (backward) came out as a separate factor (intbuy) as in the analysis of supplier power. This strongly suggests that vertical integration is a phenomenon that is independent of the three sources of buyer or supplier power outlined in the literature review.
Comparing the factor analyses of the supplier and buyer power variables, we may note the high similarity in the results. Both analyses lead to four factors and in both cases highly comparable factors are found. Since the concepts of supplier and buyer power are symmetrical, one expects such a finding. This and the fact that similar results are found with other samples in Sesame lend credibility to the finding that the power concept is multidimensional. It therefore needs to be measured as such in analyses linking power to profitability.
Regression analysis of the power measures
Does power matter for firm profitability? Do the four power concepts have a different impact? As noted in the literature review, the different ways to structure and manage relationships among suppliers, sellers, and buyers produce conflicting predictions on the impact of buyer and supplier power on profitability. We discussed three factors in particular: the degree of vertical integration across the supply chain, the extent of market share leadership in the sellers' industry, and the possibility that Pareto optimal solutions may be negotiated among buyers, sellers, and suppliers.
Given that the factor analyses produced vertical integration factors that are different from the other factors, we may evaluate the effects of integration from buyers and suppliers on seller profitability directly from the size and direction of these variables in the regressions. The effect of a different market share distribution among the sectors is dealt with in a different way. The Sesame data base does not contain a Herfindahl index for the industries of the suppliers, sellers, and buyers. We therefore do not have a direct measure of share distribution. However, Sesame has estimates of the share of the leading firm in each industry (lms). By dividing the power factors identified above by the lms in the seller's industry, one may construct power measures that take account of the fact that the sellers in the various sectors have a different market share distribution and thus are in a different position to counter the power of the buyers and suppliers. Specifically, these normalized power factors will have a high value if the numerator (power factor) has a high value and the denominator (lms) a low value. In these cases, the supplier or buyer industry can exercise substantial power and the sellers' industry lacks the leadership to counteract it. Vice versa, the normalized power factors have the lowest value if the numerator is small and the denominator is high. In these situations, the sellers' industry potentially has the upper hand given the presence of a leading firm and relatively weak buyers and suppliers. In sum, the regressions below use normalized power variables rather than the original power factors to capture the different degree of countervailing power of sellers in the different sectors.
The direction of the effects of the power variables on firm profitability is, as mentioned, dependent on the type of relationship that is negotiated among suppliers, sellers, and buyers. There is no detailed information on the relationships in the data base. However, a finding of a positive relationship of the power factors with firm profitability very likely indicates an integrative negotiation relationship where parties work to obtain Pareto efficient outcomes. In contrast, one may assume that traditional, distributive power relationships are at work if a negative sign is found for the power factors.
Regarding the control variables that are included in the regression model, the predictions are less ambiguous. All else equal, we expect a positive sign for the relative market share variable, relms; a positive sign for the growth variable; a negative sign for the subst variable; and a positive sign for the capint barrier to entry. These are in line with the mainstream IO and strategy arguments. The regression results for the LS, fixed effects (LSDV), random effects (GLS), and LAD regressions are given in Table  3 .
Choice of regression method
First, an inspection of the results of each regression method reveals that the estimates are very similar. There is not a single sign reversal and most of the estimates are of a similar size for each of the estimation methods. In addition, the large majority of the variables that are significant with one method are significant also with the other methods. The similarity of the estimates suggests that the results are robust with respect to the choice of regression method. Second, the regression diagnostics suggest that the least-squares (LS) estimates (with heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) best fit the data. The least-squares model with dummy variables (LSDV) which tests for fixed effects for each of the sectors does not lead to a better fit; the Fstatistic from the comparison of the restricted LS model with the unrestricted LSDV model is only 0.66. Thus, a modeling with dummy variables for the sectors only reduces the degrees of freedom and does not add explanatory power. Not surprisingly then, the Hausman test ( 2 (3) = 1.95) does not allow us to conclude that the fixed effects model is to be preferred over the random effects model. 12 Combined, these tests suggest that the various sectors are very comparable and may be pooled in one sample. The results indirectly also validate our efforts to select as homogeneous a sample as possible.
The least absolute deviations (LAD) method is useful when the data has outliers since these have a more than proportional impact on LS estimates. If the LS and LAD estimates differ widely, one may suspect the presence of outliers. As mentioned before, we included only those industries which have more than 20 firms each to reduce possible noise from outliers. Table 3 shows that the LS and LAD estimates are very similar. Thus, there do not appear to be serious outlier problems which gives further confidence in the LS results. We will therefore use the LS estimates to interpret the regression results.
Regression results
As a first observation, we note that the control variables come out very significantly and with the expected sign. The coefficients for growth (1.22), subst (−0.62) and capint (0.07) indicate that firms which operate in markets where there is a high growth in demand, a low threat of substitution, and high barriers to entry tend to be more profitable. The positive coefficient for relms (0.62) indicates that firms which, in addition, achieve a higher market share relative to the other firms in their market appear to achieve even higher profits.
The size of the coefficients cannot be compared to establish the relative importance of the variables for firm profitability since the variables are expressed in different units. This comparability problem may be overcome by using the partial correlation coefficient of each independent variable with firm profitability.
13 Alternatively, one can use an estimate of the incremental contribution (ic) of each variable to the overall explanatory power (r 2 ) of the model. Theil (1971: 163-192) shows that the overall r 2 can be decomposed into the sum of the incremental contributions of each explanatory variable (and a multicollinearity effect). The value for each variable gives the magnitude of each variable in the total variance that is explained by the model, taking into account the effect of the other explanatory variables. The partial correlations and the incremental contributions are related to each other in a straightforward way.
14 Since the incremental contribution provides a more direct estimate of the importance of each variable, we will refer below to this measure only. However, the values of both the partial correlations and the incremental contributions are provided in Table 4 . Table 4 indicates that market growth (ic GROWTH = 0.054) accounts for twice the amount of variance in firm profitability than relative market share (ic RELMS = 0.026) and capital intensity (ic CAPINT = 0.028), and is six times as important as the threat of substitution (ic SUBST = 0.009) in explaining the variation in firm profitability. The overwhelming importance of market growth for firm profitability may be surprising. However, all firms in our sample are drawn from capital-13 These are calculated for each variable h as t h 2 /(t h 2 + d.f.), where d.f. stands for degrees of freedom. We could also use the standardized beta coefficients to compare the estimates. However, the partial correlation coefficients allow a more straightforward comparison with the incremental contribution of each variable and were therefore retained here. Also, in multiple regression, there is no relationship between the beta coefficient and the partial correlation coefficient (See Maddala, 1977: 180-119 and footnote 14 below). 14 The incremental contribution of variable h, given k − 1 other variables in the model, is calculated as (1 − R 2 )t h 2 /(n − k). intensive sectors with high fixed costs. Changes in growth have a large impact on profitability since these strongly influence whether firms will cover their fixed costs. The estimates of the effects of the power variables are given in Table 3 . Turning to the effects of attributed power first, Table 3 shows that the coefficients of both attsup (−1.05) and attbuy (−0.98) have a negative sign, which indicates that credible signaling and commitments of buyers and supplier tend to reduce profits of sellers. However, only the coefficient of attbuy has a moderate degree of statistical significance (10%, one tailed). Further, the incremental contributions to R 2 for both are very small (ic ATTBUY = 0.008; ic ATTSUP = 0.003). While factors may be identified that reflect power from signaling and commitments, their importance in explaining firm profitability in our sample is very low.
The estimates measuring the dependence of the seller on its suppliers and buyers (depsup, −1.65; depbuy, −1.30) also point to adverse effects on firm profitability and are significant at the 10 percent level. The size of the incremental contributions (ic DEPSUP = 0.011; ic DEPBUY = 0.008) shows that the importance of dependency on suppliers and buyers is of about the same magnitude as the effect of the threat of substitution. Taken together, the importance of dependence power is about a third of the importance of market growth in explaining firm profitability.
The measures of vertical integration of suppliers and buyers into the seller's industry lead to the following conclusions. Supplier power from forward integration (intsup, −0.51) appears to be negligible. In fact, it has the lowest signifiance and importance (ic INTSUP = 0.001) of all the coefficients. Vice versa, backward integration from buyers has a very significant effect on firm profitability. Its importance (ic INTBUY = 0.020) is twice as high as the effect of the threat of substitution. Further, backward integration of buyers is positively associated with the profitability of the sellers (intbuy, 2.89). The data base does not allow us to give an unequivocal explanation for this result since we do not have more information at the firm level. However, the finding is consistent with the view that buyers are dependent for a significant part of their profits on the seller's industry and thus do not fully exploit their bargaining power stemming from their knowledge of the seller's costs. It is also consistent with the explanation that buyers and sellers are able to negotiate integrative outcomes and increase the pay-offs to the sellers. This is possible in view of the composition of our sample: all sellers deal with industrial customers which may be more open to integrative bargaining than buyers for consumer products. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the drivers of this result in view of the limitations of Sesame. Neither do we know why the relation is positive for intbuy and negative for intsup. This exploratory finding obviously needs to be corroborated with further analyses at the firm level.
Finally, Table 3 shows that a higher concentration of buyers and suppliers does not erode profitability of the sellers but is positively and significantly associated with it (strsup, 2.10; strbuy, 2.34). This is particularly the case for strsup whose importance (ic STRSUP = 0.022) is comparable to the effect of relative market share on profitability. The magnitude of the effect of strbuy (ic STRBUY = 0.015) is lower but nevertheless larger than the effect of substitution. Clearly, structural power matters. However, rather than being negatively associated with seller profitability, we find a strong positive effect. As noted in the literature review, a higher concentration of suppliers and buyers may cut down on search and selling costs. In addition, it may be easier to set up integrative negotiation relationships along the supply chain when there are fewer suppliers and buyers who are informed about costs and pay-offs.
The findings may also be interpreted with respect to the debate on the importance of firmspecific vs. industry-specific factors for explaining firm profitability. We do not have estimates of the impact of asset stocks on firm profitability. To the extent that assets stock positions are not perfectly correlated with market share, the estimate of market share may understate the size of firm-specific effects on firm profitability. However, size typically provides the means to invest in resource accumulation. Therefore, market share is likely to capture a sizeable portion of asset stock effects (see e.g., Cool et al., 1989) . Further, market share also captures effects of a firm's possible use of market power. Thus, we may expect market share to capture a significant portion of firm-specific effects on firm profitability. From Table 4 , we see that the market share effect (ic RELMS = 0.026) is dominated by the effects of market growth (ic GROWTH = 0.054) and the combined importance of supplier and buyer concentration (ic STR = 0.037), is roughly equal to the importance of barriers to entry (ic CAPINT = 0.028), but dominates the effects of power from integration, dependence, and attribution. That is, firm-specific effects (as measured by relative market share) certainly are significant and important. However, industry factors are seen to be important drivers of firm profitability too. Of course, asset stocks would need to be directly included in the regressions to be more confident about this conclusion. 15 Yet it is clear that industry characteristics in general, and supplier and buyer power specifically, strongly matter for seller profitability. Table 4 may be used also to gauge the relative importance of buyer and supplier power as a 15 Upon the suggestion of one of the referees, the regressions were also run with the above set of variables and the power variables normalized by relms rather than lms to further develop the findings on firm vs. industry effects. If firm effects were to be important, the power variables normalized by the seller's market share (rather than by an indicator of the share distribution of the seller's industry) should have a significant effect of seller profits. The results of the OLS regressions are as follows. First, the estimates of the parameters of the variables shown in Table 3 hardly change in size, sign, and significance if the new set of power variables is included. Second, only one of the coefficients of the new variables is significant (at the 10% level): depbuy. Third, this coefficient is positive which could indicate, again, integrative bargaining with buyers. However, this interpretation is purely speculative since we do not yet have more detailed data. Finally, the results are not due to multicollinearity as all intercorrelations are small. The results may be obtained from the authors. whole for seller profitability. The sum of the incremental contributions for buyer power (ic BUY = 0.051) is about 50 percent higher than the total for supplier power (ic SUP = 0.037). This, and the importance of growth and the threat of substitutes, suggest that factors in the buyer's market have a major impact of firm profitability in our sample.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper attempted to contribute to the debate on the importance of industry structure vs. firmspecific factors as determinants of firm profitability. It focused on one possible source of noise in the empirical analyses: the existence of multiple power concepts, each with a different impact on profits. Empirical analysis was based on a new, detailed data base first compiled by the Banque de France in 1994 on strategy, industry structure, and profits in French manufacturing industry.
The literature review showed that there are different views of power in supply chains. We suggested that power may come from the relative degree of concentration among suppliers, sellers and buyers; the relative resource and product dependence among them; and efforts of each to establish (a perception of) power by making strategic moves and engaging in signaling. The review also showed that the effects of the different power concepts on firm profitability may not be unequivocally specified. Several factors which affect the relation are: the degree of share distribution in the seller's industry, the varying degree of integration of suppliers and buyers into the seller's industry, and the possibility that integrative rather than distributive relations are negotiated among suppliers, sellers and buyers. We suggested that analyses which do not evaluate the various possible sources of power may underestimate the importance of power in supply chains and perhaps attribute too much importance to firm-specific factors (e.g., capital stocks) as sources of profitability.
A factor analysis was conducted on variables measuring power of suppliers and buyers in a sample of 178 French manufacturing firms in capital-intensive industries. This confirmed that power is indeed a multidimensional concept and that the various strands in the power literature each have an empirical base. The factor analysis of the supplier and buyer power variables led to four supplier and buyer factors which we called structural power (concentration of buyers or suppliers), dependency power of the sellers on suppliers and buyers, attributed power of suppliers and buyers, and power stemming from forward or backward vertical integration of suppliers or buyers.
While indicators of supplier and buyer power may be identified, this does not imply that these have an impact on the profitability of firms in the middle. Various regression methods were used to obtain robust estimates of their possible impact. The following conclusions were drawn. First, factors which measure structural attributes of the seller's industry have an important impact on seller profitability. Particularly growth was found to be an important determinant but also the measure of barriers to entry (capital intensity) and the threat of substitution. Second, relative market share was seen to have a significant and positive effect, a finding often obtained in the strategy and IO literature. However, since we were unable to design the research such that we could distinguish market power from resource effects, we could only speculate on the sources of this positive association with firm profitability.
The majority of the power factors were found to have a significant impact on seller profitability. However, the effects of the dependency and attributed power factors were, generally speaking, of low importance. The low impact of commitment tactics and signaling on performance was also found recently by Lott and Opler (1996) in the context of predatory commitments. Of higher importance were the factors measuring power from backward integration and structural power of buyers and suppliers. All three were found to have a positive and important impact on seller profitability. The results from an analysis of the incremental contribution of each variable to the overall explanatory power of the model also indicated that buyer power had a much larger effect on seller profitability than supplier power. Relevant to the debate on resources vs. industry structure as drivers of seller profitability, we found the effect of firm-specific factors (as measured by relative market share) to be significant but less important than the sum of industry characteristics.
The results also have relevance for the current trend in management practice to create tight links with buyers and suppliers. To the extent that competitive advantage of sellers is not exclusively determined by their own resources and strategy, but also by the resources, strategy, and actions of suppliers and buyers, sellers need to develop skills in supply chain management. This paper shows that the actions of buyers and suppliers do matter for sellers' profitability and sometimes can enhance it. The results also indicate that buyers' actions may need particular consideration given that their impact on seller profitability is almost double the impact of suppliers' actions. Of course, this outcome may be endogenous to the extent that sellers in our sample gave more attention to the actions of buyers than those of suppliers. Yet, the results indicate that powerful customers (and suppliers) can certainly enhance seller profitability if this power can be made to work to their advantage.
The sample was very focused, which helped in the estimation and interpretation of results but imposes limits on generalizability. 16 We mentioned that similar power factors were found also in samples of a different size, which lends support to the findings in the paper. However, the absence of (strong) effects of dependence and attribution power on firm profitability may be specific to this sample and therefore cannot be generalized. The same applies to the other regression results. There obviously is a need to explore further the Sesame and other data bases beyond industrial products and the year 1993, a recession year, to validate the results. 
